In this paper, I will analyze the article by Professor Kanehara, who has served as Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary and Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, and is currently a special guest at the branch university.
His column is entitled "Improvement of Japan's" Deterrence "with China's Arms Race: Challenges in Diplomatic and Security Issues."
→ Considering China's arms race, the invasion of Taiwan, and the threat in the southwest, the improvement of deterrence is irrelevant.
[China's mighty military power]
● In the last 10 years, China's economic scale has tripled that of Japan, exceeding 70% of that of the United States. Military spending is nominally five times that of Japan. Purchasing power parity is 16 times. China will gain the ability to invade Taiwan in the next few years, according to Congressional testimony of US Indo-Pacific Commander Davidson.
It is the first time in a long time that such a huge military force appears near Japan. The tension is comparable to that of the Mongol invasions of the Kamakura period, the imperial Russia in the latter half of the 19th century, and the mid-20th century next to Japan, where the powerful Red Army blocks of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea were devastated by the defeat.
→ Often only military spending is talked about about China's arms race. To supplement the article, according to the military balance, in the last 10 years, Marine expeditionary brigade 6 → 14 and multirole aircraft (fighter-bomber) 700 → 1300, aircraft carrier 2 and landing craft 150 → 300. The landing operation ability is being improved. Even with the large-scale integrated landing exercises that are held every year, they are retaining their will and ability to invade Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands. The reason why the Japanese do not have a sense of crisis is that it is probably done far southwest of Japan, and major cities are not included in the invasion.
● The Bassie Strait, which runs between Taiwan and the Philippines, is a strategic point for Northeast Asian countries at the junction of sea lanes connecting Australia, the Gulf, and Europe. For Japan, sea lanes are not the only problem. If China were to build a naval base in Taiwan, Okinawa's defense would be very difficult. In the unlikely event of a Taiwan emergency, the islands of Yonaguni and other islands will enter the theater. Okinawa and Kyushu, where the US military is based, may also be involved. Taiwan's emergency must be deterred at all costs.
→ In the discussions over Taiwan in Japan, only "sea lanes" are often talked about, but the reference to what happened after the platform became a military base is undeniable. China's ambitions do not end in Taiwan. Not a few Chinese have stated that it doesn't make sense that Okinawa should be returned to China. Based on China's actions so far, it should be assumed that Okinawa will be targeted after Taiwan.
→ From a military point of view, the U.S. military will have to retreat from Okinawa to Guam given the current performance of weapons and the characteristics of island operations (if China makes Taiwan a military base). .. It is difficult to even project power in a position that is always within the range of the missile, and if you try to move the unit at sea / in the air, there is a high probability that the result of submersion / crash is waiting. It can't be helped. If that happens, the US military will not be able to defend Japan. In other words, it means the occupation of Taiwan ≒ the collapse of the Japan-US alliance.
● In the event of a Taiwan emergency, the United States will be at the mercy of Taiwan defense and Guam defense. What is required of Japan today is that the Self-Defense Forces protect Japan on their own, including the Maejima Islands. Even the introduction of intermediate-range missiles as a counterattack force does not seem to be enough to defend Japan.
→ There are no particular comments in the first half. It states exactly what is militaryly correct. However, it is very difficult to defend the southwestern islands. First, more than 100,000 islanders must be evacuated, and many troops must be deployed at the same time.
→ There is a section that many people misunderstand about the introduction of intermediate-range missiles. Currently, the government and the Ministry of Defense are discussing possession of enemy base attack capability in the context of canceling Aegis Ashore, but the problem is not there. The deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the southwest, as he said, is an urgent issue and a necessary capability for Japan. Currently, the US Army and the US Marine Corps are developing ground-launched anti-ship and ground missiles with a range of 1000 km. That is, the ability to deploy to the southwest and hit bases in the coastal areas of China. Similarly, the improvement of the 12SSM owned by the Self-Defense Forces and the extension of the range of MLRS are nothing but the ability to attack enemy territory.
[Japan's defense spending overtaken by South Korea]
I would like to focus on the four high-priority issues that the Kishida administration must tackle.
● First, doubling the defense budget. Japan's Self-Defense Forces are medium-sized with a total army of 250,000, but defense spending is too low. The budget for 2021 is 5,342.2 billion yen, but now it is likely to be overtaken by South Korea, which has a quarter of its economy. We must double defense spending, unmanned and labor-saving, create a strong Self-Defense Force, and at the same time prepare for cyber wars and space wars.
Unless the defense spending is increased to a level that the United States considers to be a fair alliance, the United States will eventually abandon Japan. Defense spending should be increased to 2% of GDP, or 10 trillion yen, as soon as possible.
→ Defense spending has been almost flat for the last 30 years. On the other hand, the area around Japan is crowded with some of the world's leading military nations, all of which are hostile. Frankly, with the current budget, it is not possible to fight satisfactorily with all the equipment by maintaining the equipment. Given the current declining birthrate and the recruitment status of the Self-Defense Forces, it is unlikely that the number of troops will increase any further. You'll have to spend your budget and replace it with equipment and ammunition. I don't think the United States will abandon Japan just because its defense spending is low, but there is no doubt that land defense has become difficult.
[Cyber measures and crisis management]
● The second is Japan's cyber security measures.
The finally created SDF cyber unit is not authorized to protect the government or the private sector. The police have a high level of cybercrime ability, but they cannot cope with the severity of an emergency. Like the police, the Cyber Security Center of the Cabinet Secretariat responds to situations after an incident occurs, and does not build a system to protect the Japanese government and important infrastructure. The Japanese intelligence community is distant from the finally created Digital Agency. There may be concerns about cyber security. In such a case, it is difficult to survive in an era when cyber warfare affects the fate of the nation.
→ As you pointed out, there is no organization that centrally controls Japanese cyber organizations. Only the Self-Defense Forces can grasp and act from the perspective of national security. The police, NISC, and the Digi Agency are only concerned about dealing with cybercrime in peacetime. Despite this, the SDF's cyber units are very small and the budget is significantly inadequate. And they do not have the authority to protect critical infrastructure that is attacked in the event of an emergency. The country is not thinking about security.
→ Another problem in cyber operations is the legal restrictions of SDF cyber units in peacetime. Currently, the Self-Defense Forces are building the ability to thwart enemy cyber attacks in the event of an emergency. Due to the nature of cyber operations, it is necessary to collect information on enemy networks and systems in advance and set up a program for sabotage. Just because it's an emergency doesn't mean you can do it. On the other hand, the collection of information in cyberspace is usually treated as a crime under the "Unauthorized Access Prohibition Law". No matter how much cyber troops are in place, nothing can be done unless the law is amended.
● Third is the enhancement of crisis management in the event of an emergency. Specifically, it is a ministerial-level exercise assuming an emergency. Disasters indiscriminately take away the happiness and lives of innocent people. There is no information after the disaster. A large group of 100,000 people with different command and command systems, such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, and the Japan Coast Guard, must be moved at once. It is required to carry out a predetermined plan at the speed of God. Disaster prevention is to save a large amount of lost lives in the Gori fog every second in the depopulation of information. The best of these is war. The Self-Defense Forces, which established the Joint Staff Office in 2006, are enthusiastic about integrated training, but the prime minister who commands the Self-Defense Forces and the government, which is supposed to protect the home front and protect the people, are not prepared for the war. The Japanese government has never thought about war. Moreover, the prime minister and ministers will change in less than two years. At this rate, the Japanese government will collapse while the Self-Defense Forces are fighting. Crisis management is the same as sports. Lectures are meaningless. A team that is not practicing cannot win. The same is true for war.
→ From a security perspective, the Self-Defense Forces are the only ones that are actually working hard. You will be surprised when the people hear it. There is no other country like this except Japan. The Ministry of Defense is working hard to follow what the government does not do with a small budget. It's too late since it actually happened. Below the Prime Minister, it is necessary to work seriously.
[Fusion of science and technology and security policy]
●Fourth is the fusion of science and technology policy and security policy.
The problem is that Japan's academia is blocking cooperation with the government, especially the Ministry of Defense, by exerting strong totalitarian sympathetic pressure on even the best researchers and engineers who want to contribute to national security. That is. A few years ago, when the Ministry of Defense established a security technology development promotion system for the purpose of research exchange with academic societies and engineers in industry with a budget of only 10 billion yen, the Science Council of Japan immediately announced the Ministry of Defense. I mentioned that research was prohibited. Universities all over Japan followed this.
At this rate, it will be difficult for Japan to cooperate with academia in terms of security. The government provides R & D expenditure of 4 trillion yen a year, which is almost equivalent to defense expenditure, but the current situation in Japan is that it is not utilized for national security at all.
→ Japanese universities and research institutes, including the Science Council of Japan, are hostile to the Self-Defense Forces. He hasn't helped a millimeter with the technology to defend Japan, but rather has even leaked the technology to China. With trillions of yen a year of taxes, it's hard to tell which country it exists for. The reality is that many research institutes and universities have already been eroded by China.
