I don't think anyone has heard of the Ground Self-Defense Force dilemma.
I made it now.
I made it because I have been thinking about the security environment surrounding Japan and Japan's national defense for a long time.
Among the Ground, Sea and Air Self-Defense Forces, the Ground Self-Defense Force has a big dilemma.
It may be related to the survival of the organization.
Ground Self-Defense Force mission
The GSDF's mission is to eliminate enemy aggression, mainly on land.
(Here, we do not consider the impurities of security dispatch, disaster dispatch, and overseas dispatch)
First, looking at the mission of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, it says that the JMSDF eliminates aggression in the sea, and that the ASDF also eliminates enemies in the sky.
There is no difference in that each SDF is assigned a different territory.
On the other hand, the JMSDF and the ASDF have duties from normal times.
Speaking of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, there are things such as ensuring the safety of maritime traffic and freedom of passage, such as free navigation operations and combating piracy, and establishing relationships with other maritime nations.
If it is the Air Self-Defense Force, it will act with police authority against violations of the territory that cannot be dealt with by police force.
In addition, when dealing with North Korea's missile experiments, the JMSDF will cooperate to monitor the airspace, share information with other countries, and deploy it nationwide to intercept missiles.
The Air Self-Defense Force has been carrying out its mission firmly since normal times.
On the other hand, what about the Ground Self-Defense Force?
The Ground Self-Defense Force's peacetime mission is training.
This year, the ARC training in collaboration with Japan, the United States and France, and the Orient Shield, which was the largest practical exercise in Japan and the United States. From September 15th to the end of November, the Ground Self-Defense Force exercise (mobility training in Kyushu) is being held for the first time in decades.
These are not training areas, no matter how flashy and large they are.
Although it is said that "training contributes to deterrence," it is inferior to the priority and importance of actual missions.
If possible, the reality is that they would like to dispatch troops to overseas peacekeeping operations, etc. to perform actual duties and accumulate experience.
Full-scale land operation
In operational combat, the Ground Self-Defense Force differs from sea and air in that it has the discretion to retain or not retain the ability to handle large-scale operations.
The Air Self-Defense Force operates mainly on assets such as ships and aircraft, and conversely, it cannot be an operation without it.
In other words, whether it is a large-scale invasion or a local skirmish, what you can do and what you can do is almost the same. Also, since the assets used do not change, basically the front equipment that you have will be used according to its function.
On the other hand, what about the Ground Self-Defense Force?
The GSDF currently has a capacity of about 150,000, but there is no doubt that this is the number of people it has to carry out full-scale land operations. (Just because there are 150,000 people does not mean that a large-scale operation can be carried out.)
With this number of people and equipment, an army-scale operation is possible, and even if a few enemy divisions land on the mainland of Japan, they will be able to carry out operations to defend Japan.
In the current international situation, it is extremely unlikely that a large unit will invade.
The medium-term defense capability development plan is prepared on the premise of this.
In other words, at present, the GSDF is not required to carry out full-scale land operations.
In response to this, if the scale and ability are such that they can only deal with the threat in front of them, it will not be possible to respond in the unlikely event of a large-scale invasion. In addition, it takes several years to a dozen years to build the experience and strength that was once lost. After all, it is a pain point of the crisis management organization to consider the low possibility.
Remote island strategy
As readers know, Japan's biggest threat today is China, and the required operation is the defense of remote islands.
The defense of remote islands is roughly divided into "landing operations" and "anti-landing operations". The former is a strategy to recapture the island that was robbed by the enemy, and the latter is a strategy to deploy and deploy troops in advance so that the enemy does not rob the island.
Until World War II, it was said that a successful landing operation would require 10 times as many troops as the enemy. Looking back on the history of the war, the U.S. military landed after several weeks of naval gunfire and air strikes, destroying positions and diminishing its strength before attacking the islands held by the former Japanese army. He had put in an overwhelming force. It is so difficult to get the island back.
However, that is only the story at the weapon level of World War II.
Nowadays, military technology is developing, satellite images are constantly grasped on-site, and almost all assets are standardized in real time by radar or the like. In addition, the range, accuracy, and power of missiles have increased beyond comparison with the past, and self-destruct drones can be mass-produced at low cost.
What if we deploy and deploy troops in advance in this situation (although not allowed by local opposition), promote operational preparations, and prepare for an invasion in a landing operation?
In a situation where it is constantly monitored by satellites, it reveals what assets are where, what positions are built, and how. If that happens, the defenders of the island, which is said to be advantageous, will be destroyed by pinpoint missile attacks in the early stages.
For this reason, even if politics allowed advance development and preparation on remote islands, it would be risky and could only be developed as the situation progressed. (But it's a dilemma that you don't prepare anything?)
What if the situation is imminent and then unfolds?
The Self-Defense Forces will be deployed by aircraft and ships, but navigating the front lines with private vessels involves considerable risks such as submersion in the sea. Therefore, it will basically be developed with the ASDF assets. The more limited the transportation capacity, the longer it will take. For example, if you try to transport one division (about 10,000 people), it may take more than a month to deploy.
Generally speaking, the country considering the invasion does not bother to wait for the development and deployment of the other party and give a handicap. It will destroy it by attacking missiles and torpedoes during its weakness, Amphibious Brigades.
What I want to say is that it is very difficult to deploy later. It is not the Battle of Guadalcanal or the Battle of Leyte, but there is no guarantee that the troops will reach the island.
In addition, if we try to recover the occupied island, we will need a large-scale force as mentioned above, prior air strikes, and naval gunfire. Many SDF personnel will die.
The major difference between an enemy and the Self-Defense Forces when deploying troops on an island is whether or not they have the ability to attack the island, and the Self-Defense Forces do not have long-range ground missiles or large-scale air strike capabilities.
Summary of the dilemma
For the Ground Self-Defense Force,
① Since there is no mission in peacetime, there is no choice but to stand out in training,
② Full-scale land operations to respond to large-scale invasions are not required (if the scale cannot be maintained, it cannot be responded to in an emergency),
③ There are three major dilemmas in the question of whether or not to develop in advance in operations on remote islands.
