On November 12, 2021, the first meeting of the "Defense Strengthening Acceleration Conference" was held to discuss revisions to the national security strategy, etc.
Defense Minister Kishi said, "It is important to have a calm and realistic discussion without excluding all options," and decided to proceed with the discussion, including possession of the so-called "enemy base attack capability."
Minister Kishi said, "The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming more severe. Among them, missiles are rapidly changing and evolving, such as flying in irregular orbits."
"Enemy base attack capability" is the ability to directly attack enemy bases, such as ballistic missile launch bases. It counterattacks after the enemy launches an attack, and does not include a first strike that attacks an enemy base even though there is no attack. Until now, Japan has left the attack on the other base to the U.S. military, the Self-Defense Forces have refrained from acquiring offensive weapons and devoted themselves to defense, and have said that they do not possess "enemy base attack capability" policy-wise. ..
According to the Ministry of Defense, the reason for possessing the ability to attack enemy bases was the cancellation of the Aegis Ashore deployment plan. What was originally planned to be deployed in Akita Prefecture was made difficult to continue the business due to various inadequacies and local opposition.
The government often adds a reason in order to give a rational explanation, but it seems that there are few fronts and backs regarding this "possession of enemy base attack capability".
As already mentioned in the reference material of this post, the biggest reason is probably that the missile capabilities of China and North Korea have improved dramatically.
However, it seems that there is a slight lack of perspective in the theories scattered on the Internet and in the media. Perhaps partly because it is difficult to analyze from a military perspective, and because it has little knowledge of missiles and missile interception.
In addition, the government as a whole, including the Ministry of Defense, said, "Before the missile is launched (while it becomes difficult to intercept the missile), we will acquire the information and neutralize it." As pointed out, there are various issues.
In this paper, we will describe two points: "the background to aiming to possess the ability to attack enemy bases" and "the significance of possessing the ability to attack enemy bases".
Background to aiming to possess enemy base attack capability
I think that the title has two perspectives: (1) whether or not missile defense is possible, and (2) the effect of missiles.
First, (1) whether or not missile defense is possible.
In conclusion, ballistic missile defense should be difficult regardless of the introduction of Aegis Ashore.
As shown in the figure, in ballistic missile defense, the ASDF's fixed radar first captures the missile and calculates the ballistic missile.
The JMSDF Aegis ship (SM3) intercepts the missed shots at the mid-course stage, and the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile, Patriot (PAC3) intercepts the missed shots. Of course, before the missile is launched, there are movements such as fuel injection and asset deployment, so we will search for signs by combining satellite monitoring with HUMINT (human information). In other words, it can be said that signs can often be detected in advance for fixed missile silos. In fact, before North Korea conducted missile tests, signs of missile launches were reported, and the Self-Defense Forces (Patriot) and Aegis ships often deployed.
The problem of missile interception is mainly the missile interception rate. For example, the missile interception rate of SM3 owned by the US military (MSDF) is said to be 80 to 90%. In the past, it was reported that 5 out of 6 hits were hit in experiments conducted by the US military.
Shooting opportunities when missiles arrive are very limited. When intercepting with SM3 from an Aegis ship, there should be no time such as "shoot one missile at a time, check the effect, and then shoot the second missile if it is missed." That is, in order to reliably intercept a normal ICBM, it is necessary to shoot at least two intercepting missiles at almost the same timing.
Speaking of the number of missiles, according to the latest CHINA REPORT of the US military, there are more than 1000 ICBMs suitable for Japan. In other words, when a saturated missile attack is carried out, hundreds of shots must be intercepted at once. According to the Defense of Japan, there are about 100 Air Self-Defense Force Petriots and four SM3-equipped Aegis ships. Considering that missile attacks do not always come to the place where they are deployed, it seems that it was difficult to fully carry out missile defense even before the progress of missile technology.
That's right, Russian avant-garde and Chinese hypersonic missiles fly at speeds of Mach 5 and above, and maneuver irregularly. From the perspective of "improving the missile's flight speed," there is not enough time between capturing with radar and intercepting with missiles. From the point of view of "irregular maneuver", missiles must be constantly captured and maneuvered, and even if an interceptor missile is launched within range, it may be avoided.
In other words, the increase in the number and capabilities of missiles has made missile defense, which was originally difficult, even more difficult.
At the beginning, the discontinuation of the deployment of "Aegis Ashore" was the main reason for considering the ability to attack enemy bases, but it was only a trigger for reasoning, and it was only missile defense regardless of deployment. Is difficult to deal with in the first place.
② Missile effect
After the war, nuclear missile attacks became possible due to the development of missile technology and the miniaturization of nuclear weapons in line with the arms race caused by the US-Soviet Cold War. At present, it is said that China and North Korea possess this ability around Japan, including the United States and Russia. So far, the US and the Soviet Union have deterred the use of nuclear weapons through a MAD (mutual assured destruction) strategy *. This is the same between the United States and Russia, which are currently the two major nuclear powers.
* A deterrent strategy that discourages preemptive nuclear attacks by surviving the first attack from a nuclear attack and ensuring the opponent's catastrophic retaliation capability with nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, China is increasing its production of nuclear weapons. Currently, it has hundreds of nuclear weapons, but according to a report on China's military power released by the U.S. Department of Defense in November 2021, it has 700 nuclear weapons by 2027 and 1000 nuclear weapons by 2030. Then it is analyzed.
That is, in the future, many Chinese missiles could carry nuclear weapons.
In general, security threats consist of three parts: "ability" + "will" + "environment". At the time of the Cold War, Russia had a large number of nuclear missiles, but it should have had no intention of launching them at Japan. Therefore, it can be said that the US nuclear umbrella under the MAD strategy had little to do with honesty, whether it worked or not. On the other hand, it remains a serious question whether the US nuclear umbrella will work for China and North Korea today. In order to secure deterrence by the nuclear umbrella, China and North Korea must be made to think that "if Japan is attacked, the United States will risk a nuclear attack on the mainland and repeat the nuclear attack." In fact, this would be a pretty high hurdle.
A nuclear umbrella is better than nothing, but full trust is extremely dangerous.
Many Japanese know the power of nuclear weapons. Not only its destructive power, but also the effect on the human body due to radiation exposure cannot be planned. A single hit will ruin the city's functions and citizens.
From the viewpoint of (2) in addition to (1), it can be seen that missile defense has not been established.
Significance of possessing enemy base attack capability
Since the Ministry of Defense cites the reason for possessing an enemy base attack as "because missile defense has become difficult", the ability that should be possessed naturally is "to neutralize this before an enemy missile attack is carried out." It's a consistent explanation.
On the other hand, many experts say
In possession of enemy base attack capability, in order to attack the mobile missile launch pad used for surprise attack, reconnaissance satellites and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft can accurately grasp the position, obtain information, and obtain such information in real time. In addition to the comprehensive system of communicating to the Self-Defense Forces aircraft and ships, the amount of striking units that can be surely effective is also required.
Pointed out. From the perspective of "preventing missile attacks," I think that's exactly the case.
Grasping the signs of ambushing and moving missiles is a daunting task, and frankly, the significance of having this capability is "not great" given the myriad of missile launch facilities that will increase in the future. ..
There is a reason to say "not big". That is because if you attack Japan, you can at least show the possibility of being counterattacked by a missile attack, which can improve deterrence. In Japan's position of exclusive defense without the ability to attack enemy territory, there is no way to counterattack no matter how many missiles are shot. It's a so-called punching bag. From the perspective of China and North Korea, Japan can be hit with almost no risk militarily.
Based on the above analysis, it does not make sense to devote a great deal of resources just to improve the cost-effectiveness of possessing the ability to attack enemy bases, that is, the deterrence. There must be a back aim.
As mentioned above, missile attacks are certainly a threat, but they have no fatal effect unless they are attacked by nuclear missiles. Even if 1000 missiles are fired normally, they will not be as damaged as the Great East Japan Earthquake.
Taking probabilities into account, Japan's biggest threats today are Taiwan and the Southwest contingency. In particular, recently, in response to the situation where relations between China and Taiwan are shifting to a tense state, collaborative exercises involving Japan, the United States, and other countries are frequently conducted to respond to this situation.
It is no exaggeration to say that the enemy base attack capability this time is also focused on this (although not explained by the Ministry of Defense).
In fact, according to the Ministry of Defense budget request in 2022, it is investing in the range extension of 12SSM and the development of defense gliding bullets for islands. At the Orient Shield held around July, the US Army Hymers (ground-to-ship missile) and MLRS shooting and the US-Japan joint actual shooting training are also being conducted by the Japan-US cooperation.
The U.S. Marine Corps is extending the range of NMESIS (Navy / Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Blocking System "NMESIS" │ World Tank News (worldtanknews.info)), but is currently aiming for a range of 500 km or more. It will be deployed. The US military is developing to extend the range to 1000km in the future.
And this NMESIS missile is compatible with the MLRS owned by the GSDF (I don't know if the Ministry of Defense is aware of it), which means that if the U.S. military develops it, its ally Japan could share its capabilities. Is high.
In the Nansei Islands, the range of 1000km is the distance to reach the coast of China. The Ministry of Defense may also be aware of the ability to hit China's coastal ports and airports, which could be caused by a Taiwanese or Senkaku emergency.
Below, reference materials
"Why is it the ability to attack enemy bases now?" (Public theory of time theory) | Public theory of time theory | Commentary archives | NHK commentary committee room
According to an analysis by the Ministry of Defense, North Korea launched three ballistic missiles at the same time in September 2016, and the missiles appear to have fallen to almost the same point in Japan's exclusive economic zone. It aims to improve its operational capabilities to enable saturated attacks that launch missiles and make them undefendable. Furthermore, from 2016 to 2017, we are trying difficult methods of interception, such as launching ballistic missiles at a high angle, dropping the warhead from almost directly above, and launching in a lofted orbit.
In addition, China is working to enhance its intermediate-range ballistic missiles that cover the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan.
Last year (2019) was a year when the missile crisis was even greater.
North Korea will fly low and launch new missiles that are expected to fall in anomalous orbits, and China is a supersonic weapon capable of changing its orbit while flying at more than five times the speed of sound. The missile "Dongfeng 17" has been released. It is believed that these missiles may not be intercepted by existing missile defense regimes.
Liberal Democratic Party security investigation committee officials have pointed out that the government may be considering possessing offensive capabilities to launch missiles just before launch in order to respond to this situation, but from the government No specific background has been explained yet.
(Discussion of "enemy base attack ability" so far)
In 1956, the then Cabinet of Ichiro Hatoyama said in the Diet, "For example, if an enemy base attacks with a guided bullet, it is unthinkable as the essence of self-defense to sit down and wait for death." Explained that it is permitted under the Constitution as "included in the scope of the right of self-defense" only when it is recognized that there is no other appropriate means (February 29, 1956, Cabinet Committee), and successive cabinets. Maintains this view. However, the government has explained that it does not actually assume that it will attack enemy bases as an exercise of the right of self-defense.
Prime Minister Abe also said at the plenary session of the House of Representatives last May, "I am not thinking of developing an equipment system for the purpose of attacking enemy bases. We are not considering changing the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States in the future. " (May 16, 2019 Plenary session of the House of Representatives)
Prime Minister Abe said at a press conference in June, "We must also accept the LDP's proposal," in light of the LDP's proposal to consider holding it three years ago. .. Therefore, there is a view that it may be positive for possession. However, he has not stated that he will change the government's position so far, and it is unclear whether he will steer in the NSC debate.
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