According to an article in the Sankei Shimbun, on November 17, the US-China Economic Security Investigation Commission, a bipartisan advisory body to the US Parliament, released an annual report on China's military and economic situation.
If you itemize the content of the article,
Overall,
● The Chinese army may have secured the initial ability to invade Taiwan. Difficult to deter by US conventional forces.
● China may pursue a new strategy of “limited use of nuclear weapons first”.
* Pointed out that the strategy of maintaining the minimum necessary nuclear force for retaliation against the conventional enemy country's nuclear attack is "minimum nuclear deterrence".
Looking at the details
〇 Deterrence of conflict between China and Taiwan is in a period of dangerous uncertainty. (If Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States does not have the capacity or political will to intervene in the military, deterrence will fail.)
〇 Already acquired the capabilities required for air and sea blockades, cyber attacks, and missile attacks against Taiwan 〇 Ability to land more than 25,000 troops in the early stages of the invasion
〇 Ability to mobilize civilian ships for military operations
〇 ICBM, SLBM, progress of "three pillars" of strategic bombers, deployment of Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), number of ground-launched strategic missiles deployed by China by 2030 Possibility to be "equal" to the United States
It is said that.
Securing the initial ability of the invasion
First of all, the big change is that "we have secured the initial ability to invade Taiwan."
Many experts said that they "do not have the invasion ability" because they lack the power projection ability to occupy the main island against Taiwan's ground force of about 250,000.
In this report, "the ability to land more than 25,000 troops at the initial stage" is called "the initial ability to invade."
Here's an analysis of China's landing capabilities based on military balance this year:
〇 58 amphibious ships (LPD x 3 (1500 or more each), LPD x 6 (about 800 people each), LST x 28 (200-250 people each), LSM x 21 (250-500 people each))
〇 310 landing craft (LCU x 11 (150 people each), LCM x 285 (80-200 people each), LCAC x 14)
A rough calculation can land about 20,000 people on a landing craft and about 5,000 people on a landing craft.
Furthermore, the ability to attack paratroopers and air assaults
〇 Approximately 150 transport aircraft (large x 42, medium x approx. 100)
〇 Approximately 400 transport helicopters (large x approx. 160, medium x approx. 250)
At least, about 5,000 people can attack the air assault.
Landing ships are hindered by reefs and mines, submarine torpedoes and anti-ship firepower, and airborne heribbon attacks are threatened by anti-aircraft firearms. In this respect, the numerical projection ability does not become the actual number as it is.
In order to limit the damage, China will thoroughly malfunction / destroy anti-ship / anti-aircraft firearms by cyber attacks and missile attacks, which are said to have already been acquired, and then carry out landing operations.
Looking at China's operational capabilities over the last 10 years (2011-2020),
Marines (brigade equivalent): 6 → 14 brigades
Multirole machine: 700 → 1300 machine
Destroyer: 79 → 131 ships
Landing craft: 151 → 310
Minesweeper: 73 → 58 (improved capacity)
Transport helicopter: 335 → 496 aircraft (including small helicopters)
It has become.
You can see that the ability to gain air superiority and maritime superiority has improved significantly.
Of note is the landing craft. This is owned by the Army's crossing force. Originally used for crossing the Changjiang River, it has been replaced so that it can cross the Taiwan Strait, and the number has been greatly increased.
According to reports from US researchers, "Taiwan's suitable landing sites are limited to parts of the north and south due to reefs and quays." That would be true if a huge amphibious ship were to land. On the other hand, a landing craft with a small turn can navigate with a draft of several meters and can pass through most of the mines. Since the mines are supposed to be large ships, they have a wide sense of laying.
It is difficult to detect, but a landing craft can penetrate with minimal damage. In other words, it is possible to invade a large number of troops from places where the Taiwanese army is thinly deployed. By letting this unit eliminate the anti-ship firepower in the coastal area and making it safer, it will be possible to land on a landing craft in earnest.
At the same time, training to use private vessels on the front lines has begun. I don't know how many civilian vessels there are in China, but I'm sure they will launch dozens to hundreds. It is a considerable threat including the difficulty of making an interception decision.
Taiwan's ground force is 250,000 (Army + Marine Corps). Since it is a defender, it is assumed that it is dispersed all over Taiwan. Even if the initial power projection of the Chinese army is 25,000, it will be able to project the same power locally in a few days. However, in terms of the number of people, it seems that it will not be easy to occupy Taiwan in a few days.
Difficulty of deterrence
This time, the failure of deterrence pointed out by the US Parliamentary Advisory and Investigation Agency is based on the "improvement of nuclear capacity" of the report on the Chinese military issued by the US Department of Defense in early November.
The report analyzed that it would build the capabilities of the "three pillars" of ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers, with 700 nuclear warheads by 2027 and 1,000 by 2030.
In addition, the report points out that by 2030, strategic missiles from China and the United States will be equal. In other words, it will be difficult to prevent the expansion of the use of conventional weapons by nuclear weapons.
To put it simply, if nuclear and missile capabilities are equal, nuclear deterrence will be possible, but the deterrence of conflict by conventional weapons will decline.
By adding the previously analyzed "possession of the initial ability of invasion" to this, it is analyzed that deterrence will become even more difficult.
Of course, the situation of China's internal affairs should also be in mind. The other day, on November 11, Xi Jinping passed a historical resolution along with "Mao Zedong," who founded China, and "Deng Xiaoping," who established the Chinese economy through reform and opening up. Xi Jinping is trying to compete with the two by realizing "strong China (Chinese dream)". This is probably the historical mission of "unification of Taiwan," which was said on July 1st, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the country.
Furthermore, if all goes well, Xi Jinping's term will be extended to 2027. With a number of statements in U.S. expert reports on China's capacity forecasts as of 2027 and the possibility of an invasion within six years by Commander Davidson Indo-Pacific in March this year. I think that the.
It should be remembered that such a political calendar is also the reason why deterrence is difficult.
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